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Rethinking the American Constitutional

Tradition: National Dimensions in the
Formation of State Constitutions
Christian G. Fritz

David Alan Johnson, Founding the Far West: California,Oregon,
and Nevada, 1840-1890 (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1992)
The study of the American constitutional tradition reflects a curious
duality given the central importance of federalism in the United States:
an overwhelming preoccupation with the federal constitution in contrast
to the comparative neglect of state constitutions. In one respect, the
focus of scholarly attention is easily explained in terms of the dominant
and pervasive role the federal constitution plays in the American
constitutional order. The significance of federal constitutional issues
during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, along with the rise of
federal power and the exercise of judicial review by the United States
Supreme Court, has made the federal constitution the key document in
American history. Thus, the enormous number of studies dealing with
the federal constitution is not surprising. Indeed, American constitutional
history has long been nearly synonymous with a study of the federal
Founding Fathers, the document they produced, and its interpretation.
If historical studies have centered on the federal constitution, political
scientists and legal scholars have remained even more focused on the
federal level. Those interested in the political theory of American
constitutional government routinely limit themselves to the ideas of the
federal framers and the debates that surrounded the ratification of the
federal constitution.1 The study of The FederalistPapers has become a
major subfield of American constitutional thought. In contrast, there are
relatively few studies examining the philosophical basis or intellectual
framework of state constitution making. 2 Legal scholars have gone the
furthest in equating the federal constitution with the American constitutional tradition.3 Until recently, constitutional law meant to scholars, and
largely continues to mean, decisions of the United States Supreme Court.
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Indeed, the first case book on state constitutional law only appeared in
1988. 4
Notwithstanding this federal focus, new interest in state constitutions
has come from the legal argument that state constitutions might provide
independent grounds for often broader protection of individual rights and
liberties than those provided by the federal constitution.5 Scholars
debating the role of state constitutions have mainly focused on whether
they should receive independent attention, why this is so, and how this
should be reduced to practice.6 Unfortunately, much of the recent work
stimulated by the debate over independent state constitutional grounds has
done little to advance our understanding of the thought of nineteenth
century constitution makers. Rarely delving behind constitutional text,
many studies miss the complex heritage of ideas and concerns that
preoccupied state constitution makers.
David Alan Johnson's Founding the Far West: California, Oregon,
and Nevada, 1840-1890 provides a notable departure from the traditional
federal focus by examining the political and ideological context of the
framing of state constitutions in three far western states. Johnson's
achievement lies in his richly textured and nuanced reading of how the
three states differed significantly from each other in terms of their
political culture and societies, while locating the process of statehood and
poststatehood developments within a broader context of western and
national events. Founding the Far West is a deeply researched, wellwritten and organized study of the circumstances and manner in which
California, Oregon, and Nevada achieved statehood and entered into
national life by the late nineteenth century. Anyone interested in the
history of those states will profit from Johnson's book and learn much
not previously known about their earliest constitution makers. Johnson
analyzes the debates within each convention in terms of how issues were
introduced and resolved and how certain delegates took leading roles in
each body. Moreover, since two of the three states examined, California
and Oregon, have played leading roles in the current development of
identifying independent state constitutional grounds, greater insight into
their constitutional formation has both legal relevance and historical
value.7
While not strictly a constitutional history, Founding the Far West
offers important insights into the context of nineteenth century state
making. Johnson is mainly interested in what the state-making process
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reveals about ideology and political culture, both in terms of how the
three regions revealed links to earlier, national trends and the way in
which local circumstances produced particularized effects on politics and
society. Johnson focuses on how delegates to constitutional conventions
in California (1849), Oregon (1857), and Nevada (1864) as -authors of
formal charters of government" adapted -familiar political practices to the
local conditions they encountered." (p. 2) Sharing -a space in time,"
settlers "carried to the Far West similar cultural baggage." (p. 3)
Nonetheless, Johnson concludes that distinctive ideologies and political
cultures prevailed among the people who settled the three regions which,
in turn, affected how they drafted their initial constitutions and continued
to illuminate the character of each state well into the late nineteenth
century.
In the end, Founding the Far West exaggerates differences between
the three states. More important, it fails to appreciate a constitutional
culture broadly shared by nineteenth century constitution makers,
including those in the Far West. As such, the study invites reflection on
the impact of the collective experience of state constitution making on the
constitutional history of the three states examined. Implicit in the
existence of a tradition of state constitution making is its potential to
force a rethinking of a largely federally dominated tradition of American
constitutionalism. Initially, however, an analysis of Founding the Far
West is in order.
Crucial to Johnson's examination of statehood are the "charter
settlers" of each area. These "first effective possessors" of California,
Oregon, and Nevada strongly influenced the settlement and subsequent
history of each state. Migration to the Pacific Coast departed from the
earlier patterns of incremental westward movement. These migrants
"acted for different reasons, reasons grounded in their social and
psychological backgrounds as well as in their knowledge of (and desires
about) what awaited in the California goldfields, the farming valleys of
Oregon, and the silver mines of Nevada." The result produced "significant variations on common cultural themes" rather than "the imprinting
of a singular version of American society, economy, and politics."
Charter settlers embodied "distinct, self-selected 'fragments' of antebellum American culture and society" and thus produced constitutions that
reflected "different strains" of nineteenth century ideology and politics.
(pp. 3, 6)
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Since constitution writers were important charter settlers, Johnson
collectively analyzes the delegates to each state's first constitutional
convention! An appendix lists the delegates and gives basic biographical
information on each. (pp. 354-365) In identifying the activities of
delegates, Johnson acknowledges the slippery nature of using occupational labels for much of the nineteenth century. He notes that constitution
makers tended, as did other men of their generation, to collect rather than
master skills. Thus, the lawyers in California's 1849 convention, for
example, "'were also merchants, editors, trail guides, soldiers, and, in one
case, a physician." (p. 104)
Johnson also includes minibiographies of the handful of delegates
within each convention (six apiece in the California and Oregon
conventions and four in Nevada's convention). These delegates were
leading figures whose speeches, proposals, and presence had "the greatest
impact, whether negative or positive." (p. 367) The objective criteria for
their selection largely rested on how active they were in debate and to
what extent they headed committees. (p. 368) The lives of the leading
men personified the particular political strain or "fragment" Johnson
associates with each state. These finely wrought portraits of key
constitutional convention delegates-many long forgotten today-are the
product of considerable detective work in the historical sources and play
an integral part in the book's interpretation.
Founding the Far West is organized in three parts, within which
aspects of the experiences of California, Oregon, and Nevada are
analyzed in turn. Part One describes the political, social, and economic
context of each region on the eve of state making; Part Two examines the
constitutional conventions; Part Three deals with poststatehood developments, tracing the legacy of each state's founding. Johnson also analyzes
the voting dynamics and alignments within each convention by using a
number of statistical techniques, but appropriately relegates this information to an appendix. (pp. 370-79) The author's organization permits a
selective reading focused on a specific state. Thus, those interested only
in California could read chapters one, four, and seven as a single
narrative unit that meshes together nicely. However, this approach would
miss the author's comparative analysis of the three states and what the
book suggests about American constitution making in the nineteenth
century.
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Johnson's structure also reinforces his interpretation of distinct
political "fragments" in the three states. In Part One, Johnson offers a
portrait of California in the 1830s and 1840s, with an overview of the
mission system and its effect on the Native-American population, the
world of Hispanic rancheros, and the influx of Anglo-American and
European trappers and traders that swelled to a rush of humanity after the
discovery of gold in 1848. In contrast to the essentially individualistic,
greedy, and acquisitive gold-seekers that California attracted and the 1849
constitution they framed, the farmers who migrated to Oregon brought
their families, sought land and modest gains, but largely eschewed
commercial success. The result produced a society marked by homogeneity, familiarity and one with considerable community focus and shaped
the territory's 1857 constitution.
Politics, however, produced fierce rivalries within Oregon, initially
between Methodist missionaries and the Hudson's Bay Company. Later
political disputes produced a discourse among Oregon Democrats that
harkened back to a strain of eighteenth century classical republicanism by
displaying a suspicion of "the liberal, market-oriented, economic
individualism identified with Jacksonian Democracy elsewhere." (p. 57)
Ultimately, however, the "ingrained habits and customs of long-standing
allies and adversaries" flowed over into a "certainty and familiarity"
within the territory's convention that replicated "in microcosm" the
culture and society of Oregon. (p. 70) The seclusion that produced these
qualities differed as much from California as it did from the new society
of the Comstock Lode that appeared in Nevada.
Nevada's characteristic qualities arose from its domination by
transplanted Californians chasing the dreams and possibilities that Gold
Rush California had once seemingly offered individuals. The discovery
of the Comstock Lode in 1859 prompted an influx of overwhelmingly
single male immigration intent on mineral wealth. The frenetic and
unstable activity of this rough society of speculators with a fluctuating
population provided yet another striking contrast to the Oregonian
experience. On the eve of Nevada's 1864 convention, an economic
depression gripped the region and formed the immediate context within
which delegates met.
In turning to the actual framing of the first constitutions in Part Two,
Johnson relates constitution making to the charter societies of each state.
The respective constitution writers may not have been statistically
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representative, but in critical ways they "exemplified central features" of
each region. Although a "common antebellum political inheritance"
existed as a "powerful force" in each convention, Johnson finds the
differences that marked each body more significant than what they may
have shared as constitution makers. (p. 101) In each convention, how
and what the delegates accomplished proved a manifestation of the
peculiarities of their distinct charter societies.
In California's 1849 convention, for example, unfamiliarity among
delegates and the absence of a political party as an organizing feature in
deliberations, accentuated the importance of individual qualities of
prominent delegates. Reliance on the constitutions of Iowa and New
York as models and the role of six leading delegates were the two factors
that "ordered the delegates' behavior." The lives of the leading delegates
explained their actions within the convention and the basis for their
representativeness as political men of their "time and place in American
history." (p. 108) Johnson analyzes four issues that triggered most debate
and division within the convention: banking corporations, suffrage, rights
of free blacks, and the boundaries of the state. He sees an essential
ambivalence in the approach and resolution of these issues. In the end,
Johnson concludes that the 1849 constitution was "unremarkable as
constitutional doctrine; from beginning to end it merely repeated the
received wisdom" although in reaching that result the California delegates
"explored, though without resolving, the central dilemmas of their time
as only contemporaries could." (p. 138)
Oregon's 1857 convention likewise characterized its region. It
mirrored the concerns of a "society of family farmers who, if not eager
to escape the emerging world of commerce, finance, and manufacturing,
saw in Oregon a chance to engage (and control) this world on their own
terms." (p. 139) Like California, delegates sought guidance from existing
state constitutions as models (most notably Indiana's constitution), but
unlike California the six leading figures in Oregon's convention knew
each other well from long involvement in territorial politics. Despite the
dominance of Democrats, a breakdown in unity and anti-Democratic
opposition produced protracted debates over the judiciary, the relationship
between religion and government, immigrants and the rights of citizenship, and banks and corporations.
Johnson sees the manner in which the Oregonian delegates went
about their task as more significant than what they produced. Debates
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were marked by both a "vestigial political vocabulary" drawing from
eighteenth century republicanism and "the growing commitment of
nineteenth-century men to a natural-rights liberalism defined in terms of
individual self-seeking for economic advantage." Eventually, Oregon's
delegates reached "characteristically nineteenth-century constitutional
conclusions," but they did so "circuitously, via the dimming passageways
of eighteenth-century ideas." (pp. 139-40)
On the other hand, Nevada's convention differed as much "as could
be" from events in Oregon. (p. 189) For one thing Nevada's convention
met during the Civil War and in the midst of an economic depression.
Nevada's delegates appreciated that their convention stemmed from
congressional schemes driven by national political concerns. Their work
as "wartime service" included "revitalizing the mining economy."
Consequently, the convention displayed "the predominance of narrow
economic concerns" and assertions of loyalty to the Union. (p. 190)
Nevada's delegates largely came from mining related occupations and
were "veterans" of the California Gold Rush possessing "an individualistic producer ethic." (p. 191) A tension existed in the convention between
that individualistic ethic and a corporate ethos that anticipated the
emergence of heavily financed combinations formed to exploit the state's
mineral riches. Specifically, the debates show an undercurrent of
conflicting visions for the state that presaged the industrialism and
emergence of wage workers in the mining enterprises in the decades to
come. The issues of taxation, the judiciary, loyalty to the Union, and
subsidy for the construction of the Pacific Railroad produced the most
heated debate. Those apparently "unrelated" questions "became multiple
sides of a single complex discussion" involving "a shift in conceptions
of self, economy, and society: from a society based on the local
community to one centered on the nation-state, and from an economy of
freely competing individuals to one dependent on an intricate balance of
interrelated corporate enterprises." (p. 213)
The final section of Founding the Far West traces poststatehood
developments and the experiences of the generation following the
establishment of statehood. For each region Johnson analyzes the
changes in demographics, economic expansion, transportation, and
communication that drew each state into an ever greater "incorporation
into a national society." Nonetheless, the force of the charter settlers,
through the constitutions they framed, "persisted" in the aftermath of
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statehood. (p. 233) California, for example, experienced profound
changes in population and an emerging industrialism and agribusiness
between its first constitution and 1878. Although judging the second
convention a self-conscious admission that changes had made the first
constitution "'obsolete," Johnson views the prevalent "'corporate and
industrial regime" by the late 1870s as marking "the culmination, not
antithesis, of the earlier individualistic order of the gold rush." (p. 236)
Despite this link between the two conventions, Johnson sees the first
convention as essentially irrelevant to the second and only gives a brief
description of its work. The descent of the 1849 convention's six leading
men into "historical obscurity" by 1878 epitomized the discontinuity
between the two conventions. (p. 258)
In contrast to California, Oregon experienced only a "modest pace of
change" in the generation after statehood. (p. 271) Between 1860 and
1880 Oregon's population more than tripled, but apart from Chinese
immigration the state largely retained the social, ethnic, and racial
homogeneity of its early Anglo-American settlement. Oregon largely
owed this continuity of localism and isolation to the belated effect of
modernizing trends. Rail transportation and regularized links to national
and world markets only connected Oregon in the mid-1880s, some 15
years later than in California. Moreover, the persistent authority of
Oregon's early charter settlers contrasted with the California experience.
The 1857 constitution makers not only tended to stay in the state but
largely remained in "the thick of its public life," underscored by the
notable careers enjoyed by the six leading delegates after the convention's
end. (p. 271)
Johnson captures Nevada's poststatehood experience with the chapter
title, -Industry and Exodus." After 1864, large scale operations financed
and controlled by banks and railroads exploited Nevada's mineral
resources and helped usher the state into economic modernity. Indeed,
the establishment of a branch of the Bank of California in Nevada in the
mid-1860s "began an era of concentrated corporate control and rapid
industrialization that shaped the state to the end of the nineteenth
century." (p. 318) Nostalgia for the individualistic ethic of the California
gold miner faded with the sinking realization that mining corporations on
the Comstock Lode had developed "an industrial, wage-labor, working
class." (p. 320)
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The behavior of Nevada's constitution makers conformed to the
state's economy and its transitory population. "Just as they had joined
in the exodus from California to Nevada in the late 1850s and early
1860s, so did they leave the state they created in 1864 once the promise
it had held out to individuals evaporated." (p. 315) Nevada's charter
group not only faded from influence after statehood, but in many cases
disappeared altogether from the historical record. The obscure endings
of the careers of Nevada's four leading constitution makers provides a
final fitting contrast to the distinct paths taken by California, Oregon, and
Nevada in gaining statehood and national integration.
Despite the merits of Founding the Far West in tracing the political
and ideological process of state making, it offers exaggerated, contrasting
portraits of charter settlers to the three states, particularly with respect to
Oregon. Johnson's description of the Oregonian settlers as far less
acquisitive than their counterparts in California and Nevada is overstated.
True, many of the settlers to Oregon were farmers seeking new homes for
their families and thus quite different from many of the gold seekers to
California and Nevada with their get-rich-quick mentality. But settlers
were undoubtedly drawn to Oregon because they knew that acts of its
provisional government (and later the Oregon Donation Land Law)
offered the prospect of landownership "on a scale inconceivable in their
former homes." (p. 42) This motivation included a measure of acquisitive desire (or greed) that belies the suggestion that Oregon's settlers only
possessed "modest material horizons." (p. 270) Indeed, the diaries of the
U.S. District Court judge for Oregon-a prominent charter settler of the
territory-reveal a man and a society with considerable instincts towards
material advancement. 9 In making a valid point about differences in the
general outlook between immigrants, it was unnecessary to portray
Oregonians as indifferent to wealth.
By far the greatest weakness of Founding the Far West is that it
overlooks the existence of a shared American tradition and culture in
constitution making that influenced how delegates created state constitutions and articulated a constitutional vision. The principal reason for this
oversight stems from the book's focus on only three states and its
preoccupation with what distinguished state making in those states.
Johnson points out that the framers of the three constitutions he studies
shared the generational experience of coming of age in the 1830s and
1840s. But in his efforts to ascribe aspects of the peculiar political
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culture of each state to how delegates engaged in constitution making, he
overlooks broader connections. There were important similarities in
constitution making in California, Oregon, and Nevada that formed part
of a wider tradition of nineteenth century constitution making.
The context within which delegates approached the process of
constitution making extended far beyond the fact that the California,
Oregon, and Nevada framers were roughly the same age and shared "a
common national identity, institutional memory, recollection of exemplary
public events, party symbols and allegiances, and... understanding of
the legal precedents available to them." (p. 3) Rather, far western
constitution makers participated in a wide-ranging exercise in comparative
constitution making.
Indeed, simply examining how nineteenth century delegates drafted
constitutions shows that virtually no convention in the Far West or
elsewhere did so in isolation, but instead they had access to many
constitutional models. Johnson notes how the Iowa and New York
constitutions influenced California's 1849 constitution makers and the
references to Indiana's constitution in Oregon's convention. Such
models, however, formed only a small part of comparative constitutional
analysis by those delegates and the general pattern of wide-ranging
constitutional borrowing that marked constitution making throughout the
century. What made such models generally available was a genre of
political science literature that has largely been overlooked.
The natural tendency of delegates to be guided by earlier constitutions, constitutional experience, practice, and interpretation received a
considerable boost by the early appearance and subsequent widespread
use of compilations of all the existing state constitutions. Published as
early as 1781 and appearing in scores of different editions, these books
found their way into nearly every constitutional convention that met
during the nineteenth century.' 0 Providing a comparative basis for
thinking about state constitutions and their creation clearly underlay their
publication. Printed as pocket-sized volumes and occasionally appearing
in miniature, compilations easily travelled to remote regions and served
as handy reference tools for delegates engaged in constitution making.
Thus, despite the physical isolation and primitive conditions of some
conventions, they still had access to the accumulated final products of the
American experience in drafting written fundamental law. Indeed, both
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of California's conventions and the Oregon and Nevada conventions had
access to all the extant state constitutions at the time they met."1
The western experience in drawing on preexisting constitutional
provisions as an integral part of drafting fundamental law is suggestive
of constitutional borrowing that hardly occurred haphazardly or without
serious reflection. One recurring theme in that borrowing process
recognized that the present generation of constitution makers should profit
from the constitutional experience of other states and incorporate the best
ideas from the existing constitutions. A delegate in California's 1849
convention expressed this view in calling for selective constitutional
borrowing. The sheer number of other constitutional examples provided
"no reason why we should adopt the faults of others. We should rather
profit by their experience."' 12 Occasionally, the very latest constitutions
acquired a special reputation "because they have selected and retained
from other constitutions pretty much everything that is worth being
retained in a constitution."'13 This notion of the progressive improvement
of constitutions also meshed with the benefits of regular if not frequent
constitutional revision.
An analysis of the constitutional sources of California's 1849 bill of
rights illustrates the process of borrowing. 14 Despite complaints of
.'servilely" copying from other constitutions, the convention debates
demonstrate that delegates appreciated constitutional choices and
discussed them at considerable length.' 5 Some issues provoked less
debate than others because a consensus existed, but such agreement
hardly meant that ideas about constitution making were static or reflected
an unthinking perpetuation of past practices. Many more innovative ideas
were suggested and debated than found their way into final drafts, and
their discussion confirms the fluidity of nineteenth century constitution
making.
When California drafted its first constitution, convention delegates
had the advantage of more than half a century of state constitution
making experience, which they actively and self-consciously used. The
most recent conventions of Iowa and New York in 1846 were fresh in the
delegates' minds.' 6 Indeed, some delegates had actually served as
members of other constitutional conventions before coming to California.
Yet, it would be a mistake to assume that a cosmopolitan population
attracted to California during the Gold Rush accounted for the wide range
of consultation with other states' constitutional experiences. Even
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without the drawing power of gold other conventions also reveal the
widespread and vigorous migration of constitutional ideas.
Indeed, California's second convention in 1878 initiated debates over
many constitutional subjects that fully drew on existing state constitutions. The mammoth verbatim transcript of its proceedings for over three
months amply documents the wealth of materials drawn upon by the
delegates. Extensive comparative analysis of other constitutions formed
a regular feature of debate. The chair of the committee that drafted the
militia article, for example, defended the provision with a comprehensive
overview of other state provisions. 7 Eventually, a delegate exasperated
by such references suggested a different approach. -[I]f the law library
could be locked up and all these books that the members bring here
thrown out of sight, we could go to work and build a constitution out of
our heads, out of our inner consciences."' 8 Despite the plea for originality, the convention-in common with most nineteenth century conventions-continued to rely heavily on earlier constitutional experience.
Delegates naturally gravitated toward their existing state constitutions
when meeting to revise that document, an inclination followed by
California's second convention. Delegates agreed that certain issues, such
as corporations, the Chinese, and taxation had prompted their meeting,
but they were not prepared to redesign the entire constitutional fabric of
the state. In fact, as debates over hotly contested political issues became
protracted, delegates suggested that the 1849 constitution
be incorporated
9
whenever possible, for noncontroversial issues.
The borrowing nature of nineteenth century constitution making also
involved the judicial significance of incorporating provisions wholesale
from different constitutions. Each borrowed provision had potentially a
body of interpretation regarding its meaning, a sort of judicial gloss from
state courts that might have interpreted that provision. Indeed, state
courts might interpret similarly worded provisions differently. The
possibilities of ambiguity or of a specific interpretation based on earlier
judicial decisions were matters that far western delegates clearly understood.
In this context, interpreting a nineteenth century "patchwork"
constitution posed interesting questions. One delegate to California's
1878 convention raised this issue by stating "a cardinal canon of
interpretation of constitutions." 20 Namely, "'that where a constitutional
provision has been incorporated from the constitution of one state into the
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constitution of another state ...that the courts invariably turn to the
decisions in that [first] state to guide them in their interpretation of the
provision.'
The California delegate did not stand alone in drawing a connection
between borrowed provisions and their interpretation. In the course of
Nevada's 1864 convention, one delegate favored California's 1849
document as a model since Nevada could then take advantage of 15 years
of constitutional jurisprudence by the California Supreme Court. 22 Such
ideas naturally provided interpretative guidance to newly created
constitutions, but it does, nonetheless, suggest that the impact of
"borrowing" in nineteenth century state constitution making went well
beyond copying constitutional text.
One delegate to California's second convention expressly warned
against the dangers of the "borrowing" process of constitution making.
He accused some of his fellow delegates of having 'contracted the fatal
habit of browsing through the organic laws of the other states, borrowing
enough to show a want of invention and inventing just enough to show
a total want of judgment. 23 He then offered his understanding of the
proper basis for such borrowing.
When there can be found in

. ..

the organic law of any other

state, a terse, unmistakable expression of a broad, universal
principle of government ...

it should be presented here for our

consideration. But, when the principle of selection is carried to
the extent of pressing upon our approval those special exceptional
provisions of other organic laws which had their origin and
growth in the peculiar circumstances and condition of the
community for which they were framed; [they] are wholly
unsuited to the political habits, modes of thought, and social
wants of our own people. 24
The California delegate thus reflected an interesting self-perception.
Namely, in some ways delegates perceived themselves as members of a
broad American constitutional tradition while at the same time they
viewed themselves as "Californians" or "Oregonians" and thus requiring
2
distinctive constitutional arrangements. 5
In the final analysis, the wide awareness of constitutional models and
the discussion of their merits often produced a thoughtful process of
comparison and borrowing that helped create a shared culture of
American constitutionalism. Nineteenth century delegates recognized that
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legitimate constitution making inevitably entailed such a process of
comparative analysis and borrowing. Indeed, their view of progress
implied that more recent constitutions were improvements on earlier
attempts. This vision of constitutional progress transcended the constitutional history of individual states: increasingly delegates saw national
trends as persuasive authority for constitutional revision. Parochialism
and local circumstances never lost their pull, but many delegates
acknowledged the existence of American constitutional practices and
traditions.
Apart from overlooking a broader tradition of framing nineteenth
century constitutions of which California, Oregon, and Nevada were a
part, Founding the Far West also fails to recognize an ongoing debate
over the implications of popular sovereignty that all three conventions
reflected. In fact, the inherent nature of constitution making inevitably
raised issues and concerns that stemmed from the theoretical foundation
of American constitutions. Indeed, this dialog over the meaning of
popular sovereignty had begun with the American Revolution and
constitutional conventions formed the principal forum within which the
constitutional debate was conducted during the nineteenth century.
Despite the immediate focus on creating or altering a framework for
government and responding to substantive issues of the day, delegates
consistently returned (in varying degrees and in ways that showed
transitions from the 1820s through the 1890s) to basic underlying
questions. Such questions included what were the implications of popular
sovereignty, who were "the people," how was their voice defined, what
powers did constitutional conventions have, and what was the appropriate
scope of constitutional revision.
These questions and their implications for constitution making were
rarely discussed explicitly as topics for debate. Rather, they cropped up
in the midst of debate over all manner of substantive issues and were
often only obliquely present. Identifying such themes is difficult, if not
impossible, by examining a few discrete convention debates, but they
become evident after a widespread examination of nineteenth century
debates. Nonetheless, aspects of these foundational issues can be
detected in the debates in California, Oregon, and Nevada. Seen in this
light, the far western constitution makers contributed to an ongoing
constitutional dialogue the dimensions of which they may not have been
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fully aware, but which reflected their participation in a process they
shared with America's many other constitution makers.
Overlooking this larger debate results in missing the significance of
some positions taken and language used in the western conventions.
Johnson's depiction of the experiences of California, Oregon, and Nevada
in framing their constitutions as essentially different from one another
mutes if not ignores the collective dimension of nineteenth century
constitution making. In Oregon's convention, for example, Johnson
deftly and correctly identifies language that echoed eighteenth century
concerns over the corrupting influence of power, self-serving material
advancement rather than disinterestedness, and the need for private and
public virtue for the health of republican forms of government. Although
Johnson sees such a strain of discussion as distinct to Oregon's convention (in comparison with California and Nevada), in point of fact such
language and concerns were not uncommon. Particularly in the context
of debates over support for education, the echoes of classical republicanism in terms of the necessity of an educated and virtuous electorate to
preserve the health of republics can be found in debates over constitution
making from the eighteenth century to the end of the nineteenth century.
Moreover, Johnson's description of a version of classical republicanism epitomized by Oregon delegate Matthew Deady shared much in
common with a position held by many mid-nineteenth century delegates
about what popular sovereignty implied (or did not) with respect to the
role of the people in constitutional government. Deady, explains
Johnson, developed a self-identity as a Federalist in the eighteenth
century mold of Alexander Hamilton and George Washington. Although
Deady had been a staunch Democrat, in 1861 "he made an unexpected
(to onlookers remarkable) exit from the party that he identified, with
praise before 1861 and scorn thereafter, with the historical figure of
Thomas Jefferson." (p. 306) An abhorrence for anarchy and for political
disruptions asserting the popular will formed a critical component of
Deady's self-proclaimed federalism. Deady accused the author of the
Declaration of Independence of being "the model for every disturber of
the public peace," claiming that Jefferson's views "contain enough of
revolution nullification secession and anarchy to set the four corners of
the world by the ears." (p. 306) He linked secession to claims based on
popular sovereignty advanced by Jefferson. After the Civil War, Deady
continued to reject majoritarianism and the legitimacy of popular
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movements (whether the actions of labor organizers or anti-Chinese
agitators) that threatened the status quo. His intense "enmity" toward
working-class movements stemmed from a fear that they might prevail by
virtue of sheer numbers. (p. 307) Deady's concerns about majority will
were ultimately connected to how he viewed the people and the principle
of popular sovereignty.
In fact, Matthew Deady's mid-nineteenth century federalism did not
make him or his language politically anachronistic. Rather, his views
(and fears) about the people placed him squarely on one side of an
ongoing debate found within constitutional conventions long before
Oregon's delegates met in 1857 and that continued in conventions until
the end of the nineteenth century. This debate did not split delegates
down party lines, but rather in terms of how they understood the meaning
of popular sovereignty and its implications for American political life.
Some delegates favored the popular aspects of a government that placed
ultimate authority in the will of the people, embraced majoritarianism
with relatively few reservations, and regarded popular sovereignty as a
practical political principle that could be invoked in changing constitutions and governments. They were opposed by delegates, who shared
with Matthew Deady a deep-seated suspicion of popular movements,
fearing what they called the anarchy of sheer numbers, and who tried to
relegate popular sovereignty to an abstract, theoretical principle ultimately
subordinated to the existing government.
Constitutional or governmental changes could only, according to this
latter group of delegates, be effected through established channels and
only if the existing government agreed to the need for change. Their
greatest fear lay in the specter of revolution, and they often ridiculed the
phrase vox populi, vox Dei (the voice of the people is the voice of God)
as a foolish exaggeration of the principle of popular sovereignty. The
Civil War acted as a watershed for such delegates, underscoring for them
the implicit dangers in ideas about popular sovereignty that had led to
secession and the war. Deady clearly fell within the camp of opponents
of popular sovereignty, including the ridicule of voxpopuli (pp. 306-07),
and thus the significance of his attitudes went well beyond his selfdefined, mid-nineteenth century Oregonian federalism.
Another foundational question related to popular sovereignty that
many nineteenth century convention delegates struggled with entailed
how that principle as an expression of popular will should be implement-
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ed in provisions for future revision. Central to this issue were conflicting
attitudes of delegates over the dangers posed by popular expressions and
involvement in government, particularly to vested interests and property
rights. Oregon's Matthew Deady represented one end of the spectrum of
heightened concern over manifestations of popular sovereignty, which he
denigrated as mistaken assertions of "'might makes right." (p. 309)
California's 1849 convention provides glimpses of this broader debate
over popular sovereignty when delegates discussed the issue of constitutional amendments. Initially, a committee on future revision had
proposed that a two-thirds legislative vote be required before an
amendment could go to the people for ratification. When a delegate
sought to change that provision to a simple majority vote, he triggered a
debate that illustrated attitudes towards majoritarianism and demonstrated
that divisions among delegates stemming from their views about the
implications of popular sovereignty crossed party lines.
James McHall Jones suggested the change to a simple majority
because it accorded with "the true democratic rule" that "'the majority
shall rule," and he argued that if they were "dissatisfied with their
constitution, let them, as they may deem fit, alter and amend it."26 Jones
was a lawyer and member of the Whig party. 27 Charles Tyler Botts,
another lawyer, but a Democrat, agreed that "inall republican countries"
only one way determined "'what shall be the fundamental law of the
country, and that is by the voice of a majority of the people." 2 Botts
also opposed "restraints" on constitutional revision because 'nothing is
more desirable than that the people should have the liberty to amend their
written Constitution according to the progressive improvement under the
science of political liberty."'29 Both Jones and Botts were among
Johnson's six leading men of the 1849 convention.
Opposition to reducing the vote from two-thirds to a majority came
from Whigs as well as Democrats and reflected the same kind of anxiety
that Matthew Deady expressed about the disturbing possibilities of
majority control. Myron Norton, a Democrat and lawyer, opposed the
change because in constitutional revision "every step should be well
guarded, and nothing should be done hastily, or under the fluctuating
influences of political excitement. ' 30 A Whig delegate, Francis Lippitt
also warned against a "mere transient majority" effecting "transient
changes," and he emphasized the need for "checks upon the will of the
people.'
Henry Tefft, of uncertain political affiliation, expressed the
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worry of many who wanted a two-thirds vote as a safeguard against
"political excitement" when he proclaimed himself "as much in favor of
referring all power to the people as any gentleman present, but this
constant cry of the people too often assumes the aspect of demagogism.,

32

In the end, the convention did not impose a two-thirds voting

requirement. 33 California's debate in 1849 over the voting barrier for
amendments thus reveals in microcosm one of the underlying issues that
split nineteenth century constitutional conventions.
Often, attitudes towards majoritarianism did not explicitly surface in
debates over constitutional revision but can still be detected as an
undercurrent among delegates. In Oregon's convention, for example,
delegates spent little time debating the revision provision. In a final
speech summarizing the advantages of the draft constitution, a lawyer and
Democrat, Delazon Smith touted an amendment procedure allowing
change to "take place quietly, silently."34 In the course of debating other
issues, however, concerns about majoritarianism can be discerned. For
example, Smith had earlier suggested that prohibiting the sale of liquor
violated natural law and was beyond the capacity of the "majority of the
people" and "the sovereignty of the citizens of the territories" to permit
'35
such a prohibition in "defiance of the wishes of the minority.
Prohibition conjured up "mobs" and "men constantly up everywhere, in
arms against and resisting the constitution. 3 6 However, Hector Campbell, another Democrat and farmer, in the course of defending the right
of the legislature to hire a chaplin, alluded to the eighteenth century
founding fathers as having "first discovered that new principle in the
science of government ....

which is the cornerstone of democracy and

the foundation upon which all the institutions of popular sovereignty
rest-that the clearly expressed will of the majority shall rule. 37
Fears about the potential abuse of popular sovereignty or confidence
in its exercise expressed by convention delegates shifted over the course
of the nineteenth century. The Dorr Rebellion (a popular movement that
challenged the existing government in Rhode Island in the 1840s) and the
Civil War had the greatest impact on how nineteenth century delegates
debated popular sovereignty. Even during the Civil War, indeed, because
of the context, Nevada's delegates addressed this issue. In debating the
revision provisions of the 1864 constitution, they repeatedly expressed
fears about transitory changes in the document they were framing, but in
terms that clearly indicated the unstable times. George Nourse, a lawyer
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who had voted for Lincoln in 1860, spoke for many delegates when he
favored a two-thirds legislative vote requirement so that "no sudden
whirlwind of passion, or feeling, or of fancied interest, shall bring about
the hasty adoption of an amendment perhaps radical in its character, and
changing important features in our Constitution. 38 That much, reflected
current events, but he went on to emphasize the importance of guarding
.not only against the hasty action of the people's servants, but also
against that of the people themselves" when it came to constitutional
revision.39
Particularly after the Civil War, some delegates emphasized the need
to procedurally constrain constitutional revision as a means of tempering
the revolutionary potential of popular sovereignty. Indeed, California's
1878 convention reveals the ill-ease increasingly felt by some delegates
about even stating the principle. In the language describing "the right of
the people to alter or reform their government whenever the public good
may require it" one delegate found "an assertion from which revolutionists forever find at least a shadow of authority."' 40 Another delegate in the
same convention exemplified how certain constitution makers sought to
limit, control, and channel the popular exercise of sovereignty. The "true
proposition" of the principle only granted ."the right to alter or reform... as provided in the constitution or otherwise, when the cause
exists,' defining the direct causes.""4 In addition to restrictions on
popular sovereignty the delegate also implied the necessity of dire
circumstances as a precondition for constitutional revision.
In the end, Founding the Far West is an important scholarly
contribution to nineteenth century American history. However, its
analysis of how California, Oregon, and Nevada became states identifies
a dynamic that fails to capture the tradition of American constitution
making. If anything, what those three states shared with other nineteenth
century constitution making experiences-given the particular characteristics and differences in each state so well documented by Johnsonunderscores the strength of a wider American constitutional tradition.
Only when state constitution making is more widely studied can the
dimensions of that tradition be understood in ways that will integrate the
meaning of the state constitutional experience. So too, the recent interest
in state constitutions as documents having an independent source of
constitutional authority may curb the ingrained habit of studying
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American constitutional law from "the top down" and encourage scholars
to bring a less national perspective to both constitutional law and history.
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